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“A Marshallese without land is no Marshallese at all”
Old Marshallese saying (Erickson 2011, 44)
Empires are frequently imagined as military behemoths conquering all. The commercially successful
Sega computer game Empire with its tag line “Total War” illustrates this notion. Nevertheless, this
piece investigates a frequently ignored strategy of imperial development: viz. that empires can be
acquired by way of lease and purchase, a means of expansion resembling the way by which
individuals obtain property when playing the board game Monopoly (Alessio 2010). Such expansion
is generally successful if assessed by: the amount of land territory obtained; the length of imperial
control; a lack of excessive military and administrative expenditure when achieving this outcome;
few immediate lives lost; and a lack of international criticism. This empire-building process is
particularly relevant to the evolution of the continental 19th century United States as evidenced by
its purchases of the Louisiana, Alaska, and Gadsden territories, whose combined area of land is
staggeringly large. Alessio and Renfro (2015) argue that this method of expansion has been hidden in
plain sight and this helps explain why many do not consider the nation imperial. Building upon
previous work on this subject this article contends that Washington’s expansion through purchase or
1

lease is ongoing and understudied. Moreover, this research uses the literature on empire and a case
study of Washington’s imperium in the Micronesian Pacific to demonstrate that the U.S. has long
been, and continues to be, an imperial power – despite political, cultural, and academic claims to the
contrary.

Although the U.S. continues to evolve its empire via purchase and lease in several other extraterritorial strategic theatres, such as Diego Garcia and Guantanamo (Alessio and Renfro 2016), the
topic of leased American bases on Kwajalein (Kwaj) and Guam (Guåhån in Chamorro) remains underexamined. Indeed, there has been a lack of scholarly attention to America’s place in the Micronesian
Pacific. This is in spite of the region’s increasing importance global military and economic affairs.
Most extant work on Washington’s position in the Pacific focuses on East Asia, especially Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan. These accounts, while rich, often emphasize globalization, finance, or
alliance structures (Harvey 2005; Wade 2003; Press-Barnathan 2014), all the while circumventing
debates over American empire. This work helps to remedy this lacuna by focusing on an
understudied part of the Pacific, namely Kwaj and Guam, and also makes a positive contribution to
the literature on American empire by offering a framework and case study that suggests that
American empire is alive and well.

Kwaj is the most sizable isle in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The RMI comprises 181
square kilometres of land on some 29 atolls and five large islands with a population of circa 71,000.
Kwaj is also the site of the largest coral atoll in the world and is significant in the history of the Cold
War; 11 of its 97 islands were leased by United States military forces as support bases for that
country’s nuclear testing programme on nearby Bikini and Enewetak atolls. Today the Kwaj base is
called the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defence Test site and it remains “the centre” of a
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“sophisticated military hardware” operation, including radar and telemetry stations, anti-ballistic
missile testing, and space research (Pollock 2008: 301).

Meanwhile, Guåhån (the term Guam had been adopted by United States Navy governors in the early
1900s), is roughly the size of Barbados and has a population of circa 178,000, just over a third of
whom are indigenous Chamorro. The Department of Defense has called it “Fortress Pacific” as it
houses five American military bases, including a homeport for Polaris nuclear submarines. The
importance of both islands is underscored by Japan’s desire to reclaim land occupied by the U.S.
military which prompted Washington to look for other basing opportunities in the Pacific. Although
Washington will retain a significant presence in Okinawa, the Department of Defense plans to
relocate some forces currently based in Japan to expanded facilities in Guåhån (Kan 2014). Current
plans call for an additional 4,700 marines and their families at the expanded site by the 2020s (Burke
2014).

Both of these military sites, which continue to be leased, are seen as increasingly important to
United States strategic defence imperatives in the wake of: China’s regional aspirations; North
Korea’s nuclear volatility; and an over-“dependence on foreign-hosted bases” amongst its allies, in
particular Japan and South Korea, which are facing concerted domestic pressure for troop reductions
(Erickson 2008: 65). Indeed, these small Pacific island bases form part of Washington’s “Pivot to
Asia,” (Le Miere 2012). Consequently, at least from a United States perspective, these islands are
perceived to be a Goldilocks solution. Not only are they envisioned as causing minimal political
opposition experienced by some of their military forces elsewhere, but these virtually unsinkable
‘aircraft carriers’ are also strategically well-positioned. They are far enough away from immediate
security threats while simultaneously not too far away to respond quickly should the need arise. By
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adopting what Layne calls an “over the horizon” strategy the United States believes it can maximize
its influence with minimal expense (2006, 2009).

Thus, this work seeks to draw attention to the purchasing and leasing of territory in the Pacific.
While an idiographic accounting of this pattern of purchasing and leasing would help advance our
understanding of global politics in an important theatre, our study suggests that it is a significant
mechanism in empire building. We believe, therefore, that this work helps refine a theoretical
understanding of how empires acquire influence – especially in the context of the American empire
given its reliance on this particular method of expansion. Consequently, this paper seeks to draw
attention to an on-going and long-running imperial practise which, although constituting a major
force in geo-political developments, has been virtually disregarded. Furthermore, it demonstrates
that in a period where empire allegedly stands in contrast to global norms, polities may successfully
utilize lease or purchase to realise imperial aspirations without incurring repercussions. Indeed, such
actions by the U.S. in the Pacific have been virtually ignored in mainstream discourse: “nobody has
read a single word about it!” (Vltchek 2013: 106).

Defining empire
From the beginnings of human civilization empire has been an important form of political and social
organization: “most of human history has been characterized by large formal empires” (Blanken
2012: 2). Indeed, Darwin argues that empire is the basis of how political actors structure themselves
(2012). Yet in spite of decolonisation and the accompanying claim that empires are almost extinct,
they remain prominent in international organization. Given that empire remains such a powerfully
enduring and universal occurrence, surprisingly our conceptual understanding of it remains
impoverished. Colley states that there is “an insufficiently comprehensive approach to empire”
(2006: 368). Darwin (2012) and Steinmetz (2005) note that defining empire has posed a problem for
4

students of the phenomenon. Colas points out that empire suffers from not only a definitional
problem but also acute under-theorizing (2007). Similarly, Münkler spotlights this glaring gap in the
literature (2007).

Nevertheless, some scholars do examine the question of definition. For Doyle, empire is an unequal
relationship when one state controls another (1986:19). He surmises that it “can be achieved by
force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence” (1986: 45). Bush thinks
of empire as one state expanding beyond its original geographic domain (2006). Burbank and Cooper
argue that empires enforce critical distinctions over the power and status of peoples in the imperial
polity and its newly acquired possessions (2010). Nonetheless, in spite of attempts to define the
phenomenon there is still little agreement on how one would know empire from not empire. One
difficulty involves attempts, exemplified by Burbank and Cooper, to discriminate between nations
and empires. Colás argues the same point, namely that empires are “expansive, coercive and
hierarchical” and thus dissimilar from nation-states which are supposedly characterised by fixed
boundaries (2007: 185). These attempts to provide clarity vis-à-vis empire are made more difficult by
the range of types of empire (including the critical distinction between formal and informal empires),
as well as issues of order and hierarchy. Sharman, for example, observes that, “Students of hierarchy
operate on the assumption that classic imperial arrangements are now a thing of the past. They are
mistaken” (2011: 190). The tensions between these definitions suggest that considerable definitional
work remains necessary.

Nexon (2008: 306) notes that in informal empires the local agents typically have more power than in
formal empires as the controlling power usually does not seek to manage all domains of political
organization. Noting the potential confusion between formal and informal empire, Savage points
out that definitions of informal empire “[c]an perhaps be confused with high levels of influence.
5

Indicators of informal empire must therefore demonstrate a persistent and institutionalized
relationship of control by one state over another” (2010: 162). We argue that purchasing and
leasing territories meets this threshold. For Savage, the most important indicator of informal empire
is when the dominant state assumes crucial powers but leaves the subordinate state in charge of
most domains of political activity (162). Furthermore, formal empires are readily distinguished from
their informal counterparts because formal empires “require territorial control and assume[s]
control over both the external and internal policies of the periphery” (162). This conception is
indivisible from questions of order and hierarchy in international relations. Donnelly explores this
topic and concludes, “Formal inequalities – especially coerced inequalities – were subject to
sustained and withering attack in the last half of the 20th century. Informal protectorates, however,
exist today in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia” (2006: 151). Importantly, he opines, “Although
the issue of formality is tricky, we must avoid obscurest formalism” (151). Scholars in other
disciplines have also identified the need to recognize different forms of imperialism operating in
different places at different times. Mcleod in his study of postcolonial literature, while focusing on
the actual creation of colonies itself, also underlines the fact that settlement is “one historically
specific experience of how imperialism can work… but it is not the only way” (2000: 8). Similarly,
Bickers in his discussion of leased European and Japanese concessions in China, concedes that his
history is “untidy” (2012: 11).

Although this work similarly suggests that empire is certainly “tricky” it also argues that clinging too
narrowly to strict definitions will hinder analytic progress. Similar points have been made in relation
of definitions of fascism, for example. As Pearce argues: “There are almost as many definitions, or
interpretations, of fascism as there are historians who have studied the issue” (1997: 11). Moreover,
the ways in which scholars approach empire varies between disciplines -- and this includes norms
over the suitability of the topic for scholarly inquiry. Within the umbrella field of international
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affairs, historians and postcolonial theorists seem happier to concede that empire is important YET
imprecise. Some scholars in political science, however, are more sceptical because the concept is
harder to define and falsify. While this manuscript cannot solve the idiographic nomothetic divide
on this topic (or any other), we argue that the study of empire ought to be a big tent lest we miss
the forest for the trees. And case studies, while often misunderstood, can be of significant value.
While Gerring (2004: 345) urges scholars using case studies to remove ambiguity whenever possible,
he notes that “it hardly seems plausible that the... ambiguities… arise solely from the sloppy or
unduly belletristic habits of case study practitioners. Indeed, a certain degree of ambiguity is
inherent (emphasis in original) in the enterprise of the case study.” Consequently, narrow
definitions of empire that hinge primarily on formalism might be “cleaner”, but they sometimes rule
out many other important forms of imperial organization – including empire by lease. As Griffin
likewise argues in relation to fascism, even contested definitions remain “heuristically useful” (1995:
2). Similarly, more formal conceptions of empire tend to dismiss or downplay finance and
globalization as imperial processes. While the current analysis of American empire vis-à-vis
Micronesia is mostly concerned with Washington’s direct leasing of territory it is important to note
also that many observers link American empire in the Pacific and elsewhere with financial coercion
and capitalism (Grandin 2006; Kiely 2010; Gindin and Panitch 2013).

A related definitional problem that is as of yet unresolved is the difference between empire as an
ontology and empire (or imperialism) as a strategy. It seems clear that many political actors deny
that they are empires but routinely use imperial tactics in their foreign policies, including the United
States (Mallaby 2002; O’Reilly 2008; O’Reilly and Renfro 2007; Colas 2007; Alessio and Renfro 2016).
This difference may be of great importance to scholars of empire but its perhaps less salient for
peoples whose lived experiences confirms that empire is alive and well. Thus it turns out that,
invasion aside, imperial polities may utilize many tactics to achieve their goals, including: marriage;
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voluntary associations; invitation; treaties; land swaps; confiscation; indirect/informal control; as
well as gifts/donations by external or transnational organizations, namely the Pacific Trust
Territories conferred upon the United States by the United Nations following the defeat of Japan in
World War Two. Many of these tactics should be familiar to students of empire. Indeed, since the
start of the 21st century China and Taiwan have used a form of “dollar diplomacy” to obtain
international support by directing aid to places like the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), which
recognises the former, or the RMI which recognises the latter (D’Arcy 2014; 399). While suggesting
that there are many imperial strategies which can be adopted and adapted to make an empire this
paper merely aims to demonstrate an American reliance on leases to achieve its aims in Micronesia.
This advance helps us draw attention to the ways in which empires operate and expand and is a
useful addition to our incomplete but growing theoretical understanding of empire. This
enumeration of imperial tactics is unlikely to satisfy those who reject empire as an ontological
category worthy of scholarly attention because a complete definition of empire is not provided. In
the literature, Biccum (2013) and Blanken (2013) represent these positions well, but neither
provides a persuasive resolution. As Biccum points out, the field of international relations has not
yet fully studied or come to terms with empire as an ontological category. While incomplete, we
argue that this work helps rectify this lack of attention and helps advance our collective
understanding of this important but understudied topic.

Washington: An Empire in Denial
This work is certainly not the first to examine the ways in which empires evolve in this manner.
Motyl considers the process but thinks of it as a “dead end” because he assumes that there is no
more land to obtain (2006: 193). Colley also briefly considers empire by purchase in the American
context but does not fully explore the case (2006: 371). Several other works analyse the acquisition
of United States territory through purchase as well, but these tend to examine such developments
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as exceptional occurrences. Nevertheless, a prolific body of work on the leasing and or purchasing of
military bases and other tactical possessions exists (Cooley 2000/2001, 2008; Sandars 2000; Johnson
2004; O’Reilly and Renfro 2007). These publications focus, however, on more contemporary
acquisitions, thereby overlooking earlier cases, including the United States in the 19th century.
Furthermore, this study also posits that such works ignore United States possessions in the Pacific.
While Guåhån does receive an occasional notice Kwaj is essentially absent from most discussion.
Indeed, Motyl disregards this earlier era of acquisition and conquest entirely and refuses to
countenance the notion of Washington’s westward expansion as imperial (2006: 192). However, we
argue that empire by purchase and lease is generally downplayed but is of great importance to our
understanding our empires, foreign policy, and global affairs. Furthermore, this work stresses that
this kind of expansion merits sustained study because it is both commonplace and involves huge
swaths of territory. In other words, the so-called ‘new imperialism’ which the likes of Fergusson,
Boot, et al drew attention to following the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, is anything but new.
Additionally, this strategy of territorial expansion by monopoly imperialism assists in explaining why
the United States, distinct from its Japanese and European rivals, was not normally considered an
empire, at least not a late 19th/early 20th century one. A number of scholars have commented upon
these gaps in the imperial historiography of the United States (Burns 1957: 124; Finlay 1976: 173).
Mann (2008: 7), Bush (2006: 199), and Vine (2004:132) all note that citizens and leaders of the
United States generally believe that their state is not imperial. This denial lingers in spite of the more
familiar revisionism of Charles Beard, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber and William Appleman Williams.
Unsurprising, Colley asserts that Americans are somewhat “disengaged” and oblivious to their
imperial past (2006: 374).

The United States also partially disguised its imperial ambitions vis-à-vis 18th and 19th century First
Nations by exploiting “treaties” to gain additional land, again insinuating that imperial powers
9

invade but that the United States confers freely for further territory. Because the nation did
participate in frequent conflict with First Nation peoples this declaration was inaccurate.
Nonetheless, it allowed Washington to employ a kind of Baudrillardian “decoy”, thus masking its
imperial status. Nor was the United States alone in pursuing such an approach. Indeed, the tradition
of signing treaties and giving payment for land is, on the face of it, a type of arrangement common in
commerce, diplomacy, and international law. Significantly, however, these agreements were often
not covenants amongst sovereign equals. It should come as no surprise to learn, therefore, that the
European and Japanese leases which were “forced” on Qing China “fatally impaired” the latter’s
sovereignty, and have thus been called the ‘Unequal Treaties’ (Bickers 2012, 5). Chinese historians
even refer to them as “imperialist crimes” (Bickers 2012, 393). Cooley and Spruyt (2009) similarly
investigate strains amongst actors theoretically and legally equal but unequivocally lopsided in their
economic and political authority, but their study does not encompass the relations between EuroAmerican settlers and First Nation peoples. Nevertheless, Hertzog (2015: 78), in an historical
discussion of Iberian colonial powers in the Americas, does state that treaties were primarily about
“the subjection of all things indigenous”. This one-sidedness does not negate, still, the capacity of
First Nations and other less powerful actors to implement strategies of resistance to imperial powers
(Cooley and Nexon, 2013: 1044). Indeed, Custer was killed and the Cherokee won their case in the
Supreme Court over Georgia’s illegal trespass onto their territory. Yet eventually many First Nation
peoples were removed from both Georgia and the Dakotas.

Another explanation for historians tending to disregard the relationship between the United States
and empire could be due to the fact that the nation hid its domination through more politically
neutral expressions, such as: ‘removal’ (the early 19th century ethnic cleansing of First Peoples such
as the Cherokee); ‘commonwealth’ (the official status of Puerto Rico which was seized permanently
by the United States as a result of the 1898 Spanish-American War); ‘police action’ (Harry S.
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Truman’s description of the Korean War); ‘kinetic military action’ (the term used to describe the
ousting of Gaddafi in Libya); ‘humanitarian intervention’ (George Bush Jr’s invasion of Iraq);
‘counterterrorism campaign’ (the description of the battle against jihadi ideologies in the
contemporary Middle East); or in a Pacific context, ‘trusteeship’, ‘unincorporated territory’ and
‘Compact of Free [our italics] Association (CFA)’. It is not surprising that Chalmers Johnson stated
that “the USA…has used…euphemisms to conceal harder imperial motives” (Bush 2006: 204).

In addition to euphemism and “trick and treaty” a gap in the historical association between
imperialism and the United States could be the result of the fact that the burgeoning republic failed
to send many settlers to its overseas possessions. Furthermore, with a few maritime exceptions,
namely American Samoa, Guåhån, Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and Wake
(most of which are to be found in the Pacific!), did it seek to uphold formal control for a significant
chunk of time. Instead, it evacuated Cuba, choosing tried and tested forms of indirect control
instead, such as economic pressure, gunboat diplomacy, and/or local comprador assistance. This
indirect control characterised by lack of settlement is evident too in the former Pacific Trust
Territories, compromising today the afore mentioned RMI, plus the FSM (including Yap, Chuuk and
Pohnpei) and the Republic of Palau (RP). These islands, alongside the Northern Mariana Islands, had
been seized by the United States from Japan in World War Two. They were subsequently awarded to
America three years later by the United Nations to be held in “trusteeship” by the new superpower,
albeit with an obligation to help the islanders move towards self-government. The 1947 agreement
also “allowed the USA to establish military bases” (Friberg 2006: 124). During discussions over the
post-war situation, however, neither the United States nor the United Nations “solicited input from
Micronesians”, demonstrating the afore-mentioned asymmetrical differences between primary and
secondary sovereignties (Hirshberg 2012: 40).
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Buying and leasing imperial territory
Table One displays just some of the territories that Washington obtained directly through purchase
or lease. When considering the sheer amount of land obtained by America in this fashion it is
startling to note that this practice has been consistent and accounts for much of Washington’s
expansion.
Table One: Key Expansions Via Purchase and Lease
Territory
Purchase or Lease
Date(s)

Size

Louisiana

Purchase

1803

2,144,510 sq km

Florida

Purchase (postconflict)

1819

170,304 sq km

Platte

Purchase

1836

8, 156 sq km

Mexican Cession

Purchase (postconflict)

1848

851,342 sq km

Gadsden

Purchase

1853

76,800 sq km

Alaska

Purchase

1867

1,518,8000 sq km

Guam, Philippines and
Puerto Rico

Purchase (postconflict)

1898

309,648 sq km

Guantanamo Bay

Lease (post-conflict)

1903

120 sq km

Panama Canal Zone

Purchase

1903 - 1979

32 sq km

United States Virgin
Islands

Purchase

1916

346.4 sq km

Diego Garcia

Lease

1966

30 sq km

Kwaj

Lease

1983 Compact of Free
Association

16 sq km

(Philippines
independent 1946)

2004 Amended
Compact
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In the game of Monopoly when a player lands on a property that is owned by another player the
owner collects rent. Similarly, terrain can be leased by an imperial power as well as bought;
however, the amount of the leased territory is typically less than when it is bought. Nor is this
property frequently envisioned by the empire in question as being controlled by them for time
immemorial, although sometimes exceptions occur. Nonetheless, notwithstanding an apparent
obsession amongst scholars of the Mongol, Macedonian, British, Russian, and Roman empires over
which empire was larger, expansion by lease cannot be overlooked purely by the duration of the
lease or the size of the territory. As David bested Goliath in the Old Testament, size cannot always
be conflated with global reach. Small polities like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Qatar are far more
influential than many large states, e.g., Mongolia and Kazakhstan; and small patches of geography,
e.g., Kashmir, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, what Rieber terms “shatter zones” (2014: 9), are
often much more consequential than larger areas. It is, consequently, a mistake to dismiss leased
empires simply because they are small. As Darwin contends:
I’m sceptical of the idea that the only empires worth the historian’s attention are ‘large’
ones – whatever that vague category means… not only are empires a much more universal
phenomenon than is usually acknowledged but… they come in all shapes and sizes, and…
the ‘small’ ones repay the historian’s enquiry (2013).
Empires survive on relationships of power between asymmetrical political actors. In the past British
lands which were coloured red on a map were traditionally a sign of power. And many imperial
powers celebrated their imperial status, e.g., the large stone wall maps Mussolini had commissioned
in Rome to celebrate the re-birth of an Italian empire after his annexation of Ethiopia. These
practises began to come to an end in the post-war 20th century as many powers sought to refute
their imperial status. Empire, for many, had become a dirty word and great powers, including the
United States and Russia, attempted to refute their taxonomy while simultaneously wanting to keep
the unequal and advantageous power asymmetries they have obtained.
13

Nonetheless, despite assertions that short-lived empires such as Napoleonic France are “failed
empires” that do not qualify as world powers because of their short shelf life (Münkler 2007: 9), we
argue the contrary. Indeed, Alexander the Great’s empire might have lasted less than two decades
but the Diadochi which succeeded him were to have an enduring legacy. Consequently, even shortlived and minor colonial possessions (in terms of territory) can play major roles in world history.
Britain’s control of Hong Kong illustrates this point nicely. Unable to even consider controlling the
vastness of Qing China, European empires carved out geographically small enclaves or concessions
that hobbled the Chinese state. Bickers (2011:10) believes that contemporary Chinese leaders have
not forgotten this trespass and claims that Beijing’s current foreign policy is, in part, moved by a
desire to avenge its humiliation. As these leased concessions suggest we need to re-consider
historical attitudes towards imperial longevity and size in addition to methods of expansion. Given
the evolution of contemporary geopolitics the islands that dot the Pacific, bookended by the United
States and China, are likely to be of increasing importance.

Leasing in Micronesia
The importance of short or small leases is easily demonstrable in American history. At the very
beginning of the 20th century Washington ratified the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and obtained
France’s assets in what would become the Panama Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla 1903). Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba is a much contested lease that gives the United States perpetual control over a key
military installation after Washington’s victory in the Spanish American War in 1898. As Mauritius
began negotiating independence post-World War Two the United Kingdom agreed to exchange
Chagos for Mauritian independence in 1965 (Vine 2004: 120). London paid £3 million in
compensation and an additional £650,000 to help cover the relocation expenses for residents of the
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Chagos Islands who were resettled in Mauritius. The next year, the United States then leased Diego
Garcia from the United Kingdom (Vine 2004: 12).
Although less well known than American bases elsewhere Washington holds long-term leases on
Kwaj that last until 2066 and which may be extended until 2086. At first the story of United States
intervention in the RMI is similar to that of its conquest of northern Mexico in the sense that its
forces initially seized the island, albeit from its Japanese occupiers; then they appropriated the atoll,
with United Nations agreement, for military use. By 1951 Kwaj’s remaining inhabitants, many of
whom had been cleared by the Japanese who also used the island as a military base, were removed
to neighbouring Ebeye Island - which was not heavily populated at the time (Hirshberg 2012: 40).
While seeking to release itself from direct control of the RMI, thus appearing to meet its United
Nations obligations to encourage self-government, the U.S. simultaneously sought to maintain a
military presence by re-negotiating a new form of treaty with what are today the FSM, the RMI, and
the RP.1 Thus the “Compacts of Free Association” (or CFAs) were born. Between 1986 and 1994, and
following UN-observed plebiscites, the islands were given the option to vote for independence in
return for: continued financial assistance until 2003 ($579 US million went to the RMI alone)
(Gootnick 2007: 1); the ability of all the islanders to work and reside in the United States; and the
right for the United States to operate military bases within their territorial waters. In some ways, this
process resembles the treaties that Washington inked with First Peoples in North America. In theory,
the First Peoples were sovereign and could have refused, but in practice this was impossible. Given
the economic dependency of some of the Pacific polities on the United States it is questionable if
they actually had any real “choice” in these plebiscites. In essence the treaties and the plebiscites
granted a veneer of respectability to an outcome that was virtually guaranteed.
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It is at this point in the narrative that the leasing process per se starts to operate. With the RMI the
United States additionally provided $150 million US as a final settlement for any claims by
Marshallese living on the Bikini, Enewetak, Ronelap, and Utrik islands as a result of the 67 nuclear
tests which had been conducted in the area, without any local agreement or input, between 1946
and 1958. The amount was obtained on an estimated market rental value for the land from 19461958 (the testing period) and from 1958-2029 (the period of time which the islands are deemed to
remain contaminated) (Lum, Thomas, Redhead, Bearden, and Lazzari 2006). During one of these
tests, on March 1, 1954, an immense fireball accompanied by a twenty mile-high mushroom cloud
appeared over the Bikini Island testing site; this was “the largest nuclear device ever detonated in
the atmosphere by the USA” and a thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped over
Hiroshima (Friberg 2006: 132). While the 162 inhabitants of Bikini Atoll and the 142 persons living in
neighbouring Enewetak Atoll had been relocated to Ebeye prior to the testing, one consequence of
the explosion was the spread of radioactive fallout over the nearby inhabited atolls of Rongelap and
Utrik. Their 239 inhabitants were then “forcibly removed” to Ebeye (Friberg 2006: 132), but not
before experiencing “anoxia, vomiting, nausea, diarrhoea… skin and eye irritations… radiation
burns…loss of hair… [and later] miscarriages and stillbirths” (Schwalbenberg 1985: 111). It has been
estimated that if the total yield of the nuclear weapons tested in the RMI were spread out over the
entire testing period it would be the equivalent of 1.6 Hiroshima bombs dropped every day for
twelve years (Horowitz 2011).

As the CFA came to an end in 2004 an Amended Compact (AC) was negotiated between the United
States and the RMI. This new agreement oversaw the United States continuing to provide economic
assistance up to a figure of $1.5 billion until 2023 (Gootnick 2007: 1). However, a “subsidiary
government-to-government agreement” also saw the Department of Defense sign the aforementioned extended lease over Kwaj until 2086 (US Department of State, 2015). While the original
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CFA in the RMI had significant local support (some 60% of the population were in favour according
to the UN monitored plebiscite), and while many local inhabitants viewed this treaty as a means by
which they could maintain independence while keeping strong economic ties with the United States,
questions have been asked about the extent of this independence option. This is especially the case
given that the Compact allows the United States “full authority” for security matters. To be sure,
Friberg points out that 68% of the RMI’s government expenditure comes from the United States,
thus making the nation aid dependent (2006: 124).
It was been suggested also that the majority of peoples living on Kwaj Atoll were opposed to the
treaty, as were those impacted by the radiation tests who wanted further compensation
(Schwalbenberg 1985: 105). One Bikini Islander, Tamaki Juda, said: “we are like the people of Israel.
We wander in the desert… until the return of the promised land” (Schwartz 2008). Additionally,
there are disputes over land ownership on Kwaj and the amounts being awarded (Gootnick 2007: 3).
The fact that roughly one quarter of all RMI islanders today, circa 24,000 people, reside in the United
States, is also a Janus-shaped concern. On the one hand, it suggests that the United States has
honoured its CFA obligations by offering economic mobility to an otherwise aid-dependent and
resource-poor population. On the other hand, there are potentially inadvertent echoes for the RMI
of what happened to the inhabitants on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean who were induced by the
United Kingdom to leave to make way for a military base.
Blanken (2012:46) argues that many ignore the American empire because the United States has
often sought economic rather than territorial gain. Ignatieff lumps these less conspicuous and
informal attempts at empire together as “empire light” (2003). However, the CFAs with the RMI,
FSM, and RP suggest that there is, using the previously discussed Savage formula, a level of formal
control here given that the United States has full authority over all external security matters as well
as direct territorial governance of Kwaj Atoll itself.
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The CFA territories are not the only bases in this part of the world to be controlled directly by the
United States in this manner. The United States captured Guåhån the Spanish American War when
the warship Charleston arrived and shelled a Spanish fortress. Shortly after Guåhån was de facto
purchased and much of the island’s territory was forcibly bought or leased from its indigenous
Chamorro inhabitants by way of “domain land condemnation proceedings” (Quimby 2011: 361).
Some 11,000 Chamorros (roughly half the island’s indigenous population) were “displaced” (Quimby
2011: 361). Given that land ownership in Guåhån is a symbol of identity and authority and that the
First Peoples there control only about one quarter of the remaining land (the rest is in private nonChamorro hands), its removal is politically telling.
Historically the issue of control of Guåhån is of major military significance since the acquisition of
this base helped to kick-start the entire overseas base-building process, which today sees U.S.
installations of one kind or another in circa one hundred different nations, and with their military
controlling through leases some 720,000 acres (roughly 1800 kilometres) of strategically important
land globally (Lutz 2010). Yet in general texts dealing with United States, Spanish, or German history
these Pacific islands receive scant mention. Even in broad imperial history books the Pacific, outside
of Australia and New Zealand, is frequently over-looked. Burbank and Cooper, for example, do not
discuss German interests in the region at all and the only mention Spain usually gets is in relation to
the Philippines. The reasons for this are complex but certainly reflect a general Western and
Anglophone tendency to focus on its own history at the expense of others.
The significance of the story of American imperialism in the Pacific does not end here, however.
There are additional signifiers of a neo-imperial relationship. Firstly, although the RMI is supposed to
be represented by U.S. embassy officials overseas there is little mention of that nation officially, at
least on the London embassy website. Indeed, during a telephone enquiry in order to ascertain who
represents the RMI’s interests in the United Kingdom the embassy operator assumed we were
inquiring about “marshall arts” and proved unable to identify a relevant contact. In addition to a
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possible lack of political representation internationally the Marshallese who work on Kwaj live on
neighbouring Ebeye, an island some 6.5 kilometres away and a twenty-minute commute by boat.
Kwaj is reserved for the two thousand or so United States military personnel and their civilian staff
(States News Service 2009). While the base has all the accoutrements of suburban American life,
including a golf course, swimming pool, baseball pitch, basketball court, pools, a bowling alley, a
fitness centre, paved roads, and detached two-storey houses with well-manicured lawns, and was
deliberately designed as a utopian suburban space (it was once referred to as “a tropical Leave it to
Beaver”) (Hirschberg 2012: 41), Ebeye is its Mr. Hyde opposite. The latter, with its 15,000
population, is a small polluted island whose inhabitants have no running water, infrequent
electricity, and live in run-down shacks (Walsh 1999). There are startling parallels here with the
contrasts to be found in the former United States controlled Canal Zone, with its “swimming pools,
golf courses, parks, social clubs… and schools”, and the “destitution” to be found outside the former
Zone (Sigler 2016). Kwaj’s land area is 3.1 km2, Ebeye’s is a mere one-third of a square kilometre,
making it “more crowded than Hong Kong” (Vltchek 2013: 102, 104). While the United States does
pay rent for Kwaj it appears that the funds go direct to Majuro, the capital of the RMI, or a handful
of very wealthy absentee Kwaj landowners (Vltchek 2013: 102).
Furthermore, the methods by which the inhabitants on Kwaj were moved to Ebeye and the way in
which other RMI inhabitants joined them, mirror events on Diego Garcia and the forced removal of
the Chagossians, which was justified on the basis that they were not native to the region and had
been imported to work on the plantations. A United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) legal advisor Tony Aust, when recommending policy on Diego Garcia, suggested to “maintain
the fiction that the inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-permanent population”
(Snoxell 2008: 123). Such a stance is a modern version of Terra Nullius and ignores the historical fact
that the Chagos’s ancestors had been living there as long as British settlers had in New Zealand. The
Chagossians subsequently resorted to the courts. Yet in spite of the fact that the British High Court
19

called their removal illegal, a 2008 Law Lords' decision denied them the right of return on the basis
that compensation had been agreed. Once again the fiction of legal payment had become the basis
of dispossession. Intriguingly, a similar judicial debate during the George Bush Jr. presidency
emerged over compensation claims paid by the United States to RMI islanders affected by nuclear
testing.
Another neo-imperial warning light, this time in Guåhån’s case, is a continuing lack of political
representation. Following payment to Spain the island was ruled directly by the Department of the
Navy on the basis that it was, according to the Supreme Court’s Downes v Bidwell (1901) decision,
inhabited by “alien races, differing… in religion…” (Kinzer 2006: 103). It was conveniently overlooked that the Chamorro had converted to Roman Catholicism following centuries of Spanish
occupation. In order to begin addressing a lack of democratic accountability Guåhån was made an
‘unincorporated territory’ in 1950 through the Organic Act, wherein some local self-government was
permitted. It was only in 1968 that the inhabitants won the right to elect their own governor. In
1995 the Office of Insular Affairs was created to oversee United States policy in American Samoa,
the US Virgin Islands, the CNMI, and Guåhån; but even today: “…people born in Guam …can’t vote
for President; they have only one, nonvoting representative in Congress, and Congress can overturn
any law passed by Guam’s legislature” (Paik 2012: 26).
Conclusion
A number of key concerns surround instances of these imperial leases and purchases. Firstly, how
are ontological presuppositions such as differing ideas about land tenure being addressed? When
the British Crown and Māori rangatira (chiefs) signed Te Tiriti (the Treaty of Waitangi) in 1840
Europeans assumed land “was property to be bought and sold” (Salmond 2012: 127). Māori, on the
other hand, viewed land as “owned by all the people to be used communally and individually and
not to be possessed” (Puketapu 1966). Secondly, who is doing the signing on behalf of the peripheral
territory, a legitimate representative or a proxy? In the 1860s when the British Governor of New
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Zealand purchased land in the Waitara district of the North Island from a dissident rangatira, a deal
which a more senior chief opposed, it became the prelude to the Taranaki War. A similar
disagreement over property ownership faces the islanders of Ebeye. Thirdly, are these agreements
being settled co-operatively between equal states, or are some parties placed under duress? As
Lipson warns: “it is hard to distinguish a forced sale from a freely negotiated one” (1985: 25).
Indeed, recent U.S. federal court cases have confirmed that many Chamorro in Guåhån had their
lands taken unjustly and some restitution followed (Quimby 2011: 375). However, even if the matter
is decidedly democratically and at the local level, the fact that the Chamorro have become a
minority on their own land (they makeup roughly 37 per cent of the island’s population as a result of
massive immigration from the U.S., the Philippines and other Pacific Islands), and have few economic
choices, suggests a form of coercion (Quimby 2011: 361). The United States, nevertheless, is not the
only power to purchase and lease territory and then refuse to acknowledge its imperial nature.
Students of the Mediterranean would recognize the similarity between Washington’s arrangement
in Cuba and London’s position in contemporary Cyprus (Glenny 2000: 616). Russia too cloaks its
imperial actions, notably in the Ukraine, by way of ruses known as maskirovka (tactical deception or
denial). These non-American examples demonstrate again the universal significance of the issues
being addressed for current security concerns.

Maier (2002) and Ferguson (2002) both note that the United States is unwilling to recognize that it is
an imperial power. This work makes plain that Washington is, indeed, imperial, and that the United
States has regularly relied on a wide range of imperial instruments – including direct territorial
control through purchase and lease. Moreover, this research suggests that it remains difficult to
perfectly demarcate empire from other, more universally forms of political organization, e.g.,
hegemons and nation states, and that attention should also be given to small territories and to
empires which do not necessarily last for thousands of years. Indeed, the Third Reich lasted a mere
21

twelve years rather than one thousand yet no-one would deny its catastrophic impact. While
everyone readily recognizes empires that are forged on the battlefield a strict adherence to this
definition would rule out other empires and would promote taxonomic clarity at the expense of
understanding better this rich and varied phenomenon. Although attempts to find a single, unified
definition of empire may be unrealistic at present, this work suggests that empires may be both
formal and informal. Thus, imperial control may be attained through a variety of tactics, including
war, threat of war, and other forms of overt blackmail or intimidation. Like the act of colonial
settlement itself, these are some of “the most spectacular” modes of imperialism, but they are by no
means the only ones (McLeod 2000: 8). Other more subtle methods, such as legal arrangement
(treaties and land swaps), collusion, marriage, economic dependence, cultural ties, and purchase or
lease, can be just as effective.
This work happily concedes, therefore, that expansion via purchase and lease is not the sole
mechanism by which empires expand. Moreover, it does not suggest that American leaders carefully
devised a cunning plan of expansion by acquisition. Washington sometimes simply capitalized on the
opportunity to purchase or lease land from other polities. Indeed, it is worth remembering that
Thomas Jefferson’s representatives originally only wanted increased American rights along the
Mississippi but ended up making the Louisiana Purchase in an unexpected deal. Nor do we suggest
that such purchases or leases always have to be destructive or unequal. As Price points out: “Our
historiography of the imperial encounter has been so focused on the (very real) asymmetrical power
relations that evolved that we have not properly appreciated the expectation of more benign
outcomes” (2015). The 2014 example of Kiribati purchasing 6000 acres of land on Vanua Levu in Fiji
to secure food security and a future home as sea levels rise is a case in point. As the President of Fiji,
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, proclaimed: “You will be able to migrate with dignity. The spirit of the people
of Kiribati will not be extinguished… Fiji will not turn its back on our neighbours” (2014). Finally, this
work does not assume that imperial powers only rely on a single method of expansion. Indeed,
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successful empires usually combine various including familiar and easily recognizable approaches
like conquest and annexation, as well as less visible tactics like purchase and lease. Although this
piece has focused on Micronesia, a broader look at Washington’s place in the Pacific writ large
illustrates that the U.S. has expanded its influence via multiple, varied, and overlapping approaches,
ranging from formal, constitutional, and conspicuous to purchase and lease.
What this research highlights is that the practice of buying and leasing territory is not an outlier and
is hugely significant to both our understanding of the Pacific in the 21st century and to the ways in
which empires operate. Firstly, the amount of territory involved is noteworthy. The combined land
purchases made by the United States and Canada, for example, are larger than most of the wellknown empires in world history. Secondly, many of these imperial territories, as the cases of Kwaj
and Guåhån demonstrate, are still part of an intact empire, while many of the more recognizable
European empires of the past two centuries, e.g., German or Italian, were quite sort-lived. Thirdly,
such imperial transactions, many of which are Pacific centred, shaped the evolution and direction of
a number of contemporary modern states. It was these early and small German acquisitions in the
RMI, nearly a decade before it took formal control of Namibia which has traditionally been seen as
the start date of the Second Reich, which helped to set that nation state on its course of imperial
expansion. Similarly, U.S. involvement in Guåhån became the building block of later base
acquisitions all over the globe. Likewise, America’s nuclear testing programme on Kwaj was to have
immense Cold War importance. It is with some irony, therefore, that the term Micronesia, the 19th
century European appellation given to this region in the Pacific, means “tiny islands”; for as the
history of U.S. involvement suggests the role of this part of the world is anything but insignificant,
demonstrating again the need to re-think attitudes both towards size and the Pacific. Fourthly, a
focus upon empire in this region underlines the tragic fact that since the formal arrival of the
Spanish and up to today the entire modern history of the RMI and Guåhån appears to be one solely
of imperial control. Fifthly, while this process of territorial expansion appears to have reached its
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zenith in a previous age, the Pacific examples identified here suggest that the phenomenon
continues. Last but not least, this process of territorial acquisition seems so successful that many
have ignored these clearly imperial processes and instead focused on more visible forms of empire.

When the European explorer Magellan first came into contact with Guåhån in 1521 he called the
islands “Los Ladrones”, or Islands of Thieves, on account of the fact that local Chamorro culture was
communal, with the result that the islanders helped themselves to anything not tied down (Owen
2010: 307). This paper, however, asks ‘who are the real thieves?’, suggesting that Proudhon’s
assertion that “property is theft” is not too far off the mark when it comes to some First Peoples’
scenarios and land sales. It is no surprise perhaps that Immanuel Kant, in his Preliminary Articles For
Perpetual Peace Among States (1795), expressly stated that “A state is not… a piece of property”,
and as such should not “Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange,
Purchase [our italics] or Donation”.

Sceptics of empire abound, especially in the context of the United States (Motyl 2006), while others
(Mallaby 2002) claim that empire is resurgent. The American experience of imperialism highlighted
here differs from the latter in arguing that not only is the United States an imperial power but that
the ‘imperial moment’ never actually went away - it was always there – but just disguised. Like
Gallagher and Robinson’s assertion that the so-called ‘New Imperialism’ of the post-1880s British
World was not that new but rather ongoing, we argue that there has been “a continuity of policy”
here too (1953: 8), in this case by purchase and lease. Like the British Empire, which “worked to
establish and maintain British paramountcy by whatever means best suited the circumstances of
their diverse regions of interest” (Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 12), the same holds true for the
United States. Thus ‘The Island of Thieves’ casts doubt on the idea that empires are no longer
conceivable. Like some postcolonial calls for greater attention to be given to certain geographical
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anomalies, such as military bases and concessions (Sigler 2016), this research forces us to begin
rethinking not only definitions of the term empire but also the relationship between imperial
history, the United States, and Micronesia. In identifying the continuing imperial processes in this
region of the world our work underlines the fact that the so-called ‘winds of change’ seem to have
come to an abrupt halt at the Pacific Gyre. The Gyre is that great ocean current in the southern
ocean which runs counter-clockwise to ocean currents elsewhere in the world; as such it appears to
be a particularly symbolic boundary for signifying certain parts of the Pacific which remain isolated
from post-colonial developments elsewhere.
The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But leaves the greater villain loose
Who steals the common from off the goose.
(17th century protest against enclosure)
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